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Addressing foreign capital investors at a meeting hosted by the Union of 
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges in July 2017, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, then the President of the Turkish Republic, infamously defended 
the extended state of emergency – following an attempted coup  in the 
previous year – as was good for business: 
We keep the State of Emergency so that our business community can 
work better. I am asking you, do you have any troubles, any barriers in 
the business world? When we came to power there was [another] State 
of Emergency in place. Yet all the factories were being threatened by 
[labour] strikes. Remember those days. Is it at all the case today? On 
the contrary. Now we intervene immediately at any threat of a strike. 
We say No, we do not allow strikes here because you cannot debilitate 
our business community.1  
This is perhaps the most vivid illustration of how the rising authoritarian 
rule under Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP in its Turkish 
acronym) within the last decade was wedded to the aggressive 
neoliberalisation that marked much of the same era. Many have, indeed, 
used the analytic of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ in explicating Turkey’s 
more recent trajectory under the AKP rule, albeit through different entry 
points. Tansel (2019), for instance, mobilises the concept to denote the 
                                                 
1 https://www.evrensel.net/haber/326078/erdogandan-itiraf-ohalle-grevlere-musaade-
etmiyoruz, authors’ translation.  
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process of executive centralisation in the country’s urban governance, 
through which the state apparatus is used to facilitate capital flows and 
extend commodification of urban land and housing. Tansel argues that 
centralisation not only articulates and accelerates a state-led 
commodification process by rendering the executive branch as the main 
arbiter of social and economic policy, but also curtails mechanisms of 
democratic contestation and voicing dissent. Özden et al. (2017), on the 
other hand, frames the trajectory of neoliberalisation in Turkey as a history 
of different configurations of authoritarianism vis-à-vis deepened conflicts 
unleashed by the country’s integration into neoliberal globalisation. 
Accordingly, while the AKP’s hegemonic project has always been 
authoritarian, its contemporary and specific form – police and judiciary-
centered security state and the Islamist discourse – has been triggered by 
factors that made control over the state apparatus crucial to quash social 
and political opposition. Similarly, Adaman et al. (2019) and Adaman and 
Akbulut (forthcoming) identify a continuity in the authoritarian state form 
in Turkey and posit its more recent guise, together with developmentalism 
and populism, as a mechanism for reproducing the AKP’s rule within a 
context of heightened social and ecological costs, and as signalling a 
breakdown of broad-based consent and societal legitimacy.  
While building on these accounts, we aim to take a different path and 
elucidate a particular regime of accumulation that took shape under 
authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey, distinct in the interlinked flows of 
resources, capital and labour that it mobilises. Many have observed that 
Turkey’s contemporary developmental regime fundamentally depends on 
the expropriation of resources and space, thereby invoking the concept of 
accumulation by dispossession. Yet, we claim that the analytic of 
‘dispossession’ is inadequate in capturing the broader constellation of 
markets, state and capital in which flows of resources and labour are 
mobilised and redirected to specific aims. Instead, we use the term 
‘accumulation by dislocation’ to emphasise that this regime relies not only 
on the expropriation of resources, but also on their dislocation and 
transformation.   
More specifically, we use the qualifier ‘dislocation’, rather than 
dispossession, to point to the visibly spatial organisation in which the 
expropriation of resources into circuits of capital is taking place. Secondly, 
we utilise the term to tackle the aftermath of the ‘moment’ of dispossession 
– ie. considering what happens to the expropriated means of production 
and the dispossessed, the mechanisms by which they are managed and  the 
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ends toward which they are mobilised. In doing so, we illustrate that a 
distinct logic exists in the state’s participation in accumulation processes, 
as both the spatial organisation of dispossession and that of its aftermath 
are closely tied to the role played by the state, especially under its 
authoritarian form.  
Our argument deploys the case of Artvin, a provincial region in 
Northeastern Anatolia, where we conducted extensive field research 
between 2012-18. The region has been the target of intensive hydropower 
development and mining investments for much of Republican history, but 
more pronouncedly within the last decade.  We demonstrate that this recent 
influx set-off dynamics that not only comprise dispossession processes but 
also, more importantly, the dislocation and mobilisation of the 
dispossessed (labour), as well as the extracted materials and energy, away 
from the region to urban industrial centers. Both the separation of 
producers from their means of (re)production and the subsequent 
incorporation of labour, energy and raw materials into circuits of 
accumulation took spatial forms organised and managed by the Turkish 
state under neoliberal authoritarianism: it mediated the flows of labour, 
materials and energy through a constellation of markets, incentives and 
actors, on the one hand, and increased reliance on authoritarian measures, 
on the other. This process further intimates a particular form of 
developmentalism shaped under authoritarian neoliberalism, where the 
Turkish state marshals flows of capital, materials, energy and labour to 
specific ends – not through explicit action, but via the construction and 
organisation of markets (see also Arsel et al. forthcoming).   
While the role of the state in organising and mobilising this particular form 
of accumulation is a focal point in our argument, we do not see state 
involvement, or even increased state involvement, as the distinguishing 
feature of authoritarian neoliberalism. States have always actively 
constructed, instituted and facilitated market operations, even (and no less) 
under neoliberalism (Madra and Adaman 2018). Beyond the recognition 
that different processes of neoliberalisation have historically been 
accompanied by varying types and levels of state involvement (Peck and 
Tickell 2002), as convincingly argued by Bruff (2014), neoliberal reform 
has always been envisioned as a mobilisation of non-market institutions, 
including the state, rather than their annihilation. As Tansel (2017: 2) 
underlines, although contemporary neoliberalism – especially after the 
2008/9 crisis – reinforces and increasingly relies upon coercive state 
practices (that discipline, marginalise and criminalise oppositional social 
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forces), as well as judicial and administrative state apparatuses (that limit 
the opportunity sets of the opposition), this does not suggest ‘that the 
deployment of coercive state apparatuses for the protection of the circuits 
of capital accumulation is a new phenomenon’, nor ‘that the pre-crisis 
trajectories of neoliberalisation have been exclusively consensual’. In that 
sense, we join those who do not see as exceptional the increased scope and 
scale of the state’s role in contemporary neoliberalism. Instead, we locate 
the authoritarian turn in the specific constellation of practices and 
discourses that both restructure the state and refashion state-society 
relationships around heightened centralisation, smothering of social 
opposition and increased use of coercion.  
Furthermore, we conceptualise neoliberalism not exclusively as an 
extension and/or deepening of marketisation or commodification per se 
(see, eg., Bruff 2014), but rather as the economisation of the social and 
political realms (Madra and Adaman 2014, 2018; Adaman et al. 2019). 
That is, we, understand it as a mode of governing, where all social and 
political issues are to be resolved by creating appropriate economic 
incentives and, relatedly, producing subjectivities and conditions that are 
conducive for market relations to be institutionalised. Understood as such, 
‘neoliberalism can accommodate a range of theoretical and political 
positions with diverse policy implications, including those that can be 
identified as state interventionism’ (Adaman et al. 2019: 519). Within the 
context of authoritarian neoliberalism, then, we do not locate 
neoliberalism in state involvement to extend marketisation, but rather in 
how that involvement – economization – re-organises the social ontology. 
That very imposition, which has taken a more authoritarian form since the 
2008/9 crisis, is central in correctly locating contemporary neoliberal 
states. Framed as such, we echo Bruff (2019: 375), who claimed that 
‘neoliberalism is fundamentally about the coercive, nondemocratic, and 
unequal reorganisation of societies’.  
Our argument, thus, focuses not only on the role that the Turkish state plays 
in extending, constructing, facilitating, mediating and/or participating in 
markets. More importantly, it addresses how it effectively renders the rural 
space as a resource and people as human capital to be mobilised to 
developmentalist aims. In so doing, we aim to contribute to the literature 
on authoritarian neoliberalism, as well as the massive scholarly tradition 
on accumulation by dispossession.  
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From dispossession to dislocation 
Building on Marx’s (1977 [1867]) original formulation of enclosures and 
primitive accumulation, the conceptual framework of accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey 2005) – with its various extensions, such as 
accumulation by decarbonisation (Bumpus and Liverman 2008), by 
conservation (Büscher and Fletcher 2015), by securitisation (Massé and 
Lunstrum 2016) and by contamination (Demaria 2010) – has gained 
renewed relevance in describing processes that (re)shape the space-state-
capital nexus in a variety of settings within contemporary capitalism. Such 
reworkings of the concept can be taken to underscore its purchase as an 
analytical category, as this scholarship reveals how extra-economic forms 
of capital accumulation (ie. those outside of appropriation of surplus value 
through relations of production) are acquiring ascending significance.  
Concomitant to the revamped literature on accumulation by dispossession, 
the concept itself has come under scrutiny and further elaboration. A main 
issue taken-up within this context relates to the protagonists of 
dispossession. Li (2014) and Hall (2013), for instance, point out that 
dispossession is not always carried-out by capital and/or the state, and that 
small producers themselves can initiate waves of dispossession. In 
particular, they draw attention to how aspiring small producers can be the 
ones enclosing forms of rural commons in efforts to take advantage of 
opportunities presented by the introduction of cash crops, and the 
asymmetric market dynamics whereby more successful farmers buy up the 
lands of the less successful ones. Furthering this line of critique, Li (2014) 
challenges the assumptions around the much-romanticized notion of small 
producers/farmers by illustrating that the small producer is not necessarily 
a defender of common property, nor is the field of rural economy one 
marked by the absence of market relations. Levien (2018), somewhat 
similarly, takes issue with understanding of capital as a monolithic 
category; instead, arguing that different processes of dispossession benefit 
different fractions of capital. 
An equally important theme within this debate is related to the aftermath 
of dispossession. Hall (2013), for instance, takes issue with the assumption 
that dispossession leads to the conversion of (expropriated) means of 
production into capitalist property and formalisation of property rights. Li 
(2014), on the other hand, rightly criticises the functionalist readings of 
the concept of accumulation by dispossession, and challenges, in 
particular, the assumed link between dispossession and emergence of wage 
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labour. Arguing that the dispossessed masses are not automatically (or 
ever) incorporated into circuits of capital as wage labourers, she rather 
points to regimes of managing the dispossessed. In a similar vein, Read 
(2002) argues that both capital and wage labour are produced in the sense 
that the temporal and spatial coincidence of the two cannot be assumed a 
priori; and Hall (2013) emphasises that even when the dispossessed 
masses are eventually incorporated into circuits of capital, this often 
happens with a temporal and spatial discrepancy.  
Perhaps a more fundamental point is related to what exactly constitutes 
dispossession. An implicit assumption within different operationalisations 
of the term is the suppression and transfer of existing (common) rights to 
resources – be it through privatisation or statisation, market mechanisms, 
or use of legal or extra-legal force. Li (2014), for instance, adopts quite an 
expansive definition of dispossession that includes forms of transfer of 
property rights through market exchanges, eg. stress sales of land. In Li’s 
account, then, there is not much that distinguishes dispossession from the 
inequality-producing tendencies of market dynamics, or market 
transactions between private property holders that result in asset 
concentration. This is, however, in contrast to more conventional 
understandings of dispossession as expropriation of rights to different 
forms of social wealth held in common, drawing on Marx’s original 
formulation of primitive accumulation. Yet, as Atasoy (2017) 
demonstrates, such expropriation can also take the form of 
commodification of lands and resources under state jurisdiction. Relatedly, 
dispossession does not only imply the suppression of (formalised) 
ownership rights, but includes the eradication of access and use rights that 
provide material and immaterial bases of (re)production. Seen in this light, 
dispossession is better understood, to paraphrase Sevilla-Buitrago’s (2015: 
1003) take on enclosures and dispossession, as a mode of spatial alienation 
that erodes social and material links that enable a ‘community to produce 
itself as a work of its own’.   
What we aim to do here is to further complicate the framework of 
accumulation by dispossession, building on the case of Turkey’s 
contemporary developmental regime, along two interrelated dimensions. 
Firstly, in much of the literature on accumulation by dispossession, the role 
of the state is left unaddressed and/or implicitly assumed to be limited to 
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passing appropriate legislation.2 Yet, in-practice, nation-states 
increasingly emerge as actors both choreographing a particular dynamic 
between markets and capital, and participating in processes of capital 
accumulation. In turn, comprehending how state involvement might imply 
logics beyond being mere tools at the service of capital in not only 
providing the conditions of dispossession but orchestrating – ie. building, 
participating in and mediating – a certain mode of accumulation, calls for 
a more comprehensive and analytical treatment of the roles assumed by 
the state. Tackling the role of the state more capaciously is all the more 
pressing within the context of authoritarian neoliberalism, as the 
restructuring of state powers widen and deepen its involvement within 
regimes of accumulation.  
Secondly, in its recent uses, the notion of accumulation by dispossession 
has largely been divorced from the intertwined dynamics of the physical-
spatial transformations and changing forms of labour that this process 
engenders. Dispossession, itself a territorial articulation organised within 
spatial mechanisms (Sevilla-Buitrago 2015), does not only imply a change 
in rights and control over resources, but also the form and objective of their 
use with obvious socio-spatial implications. More fundamentally, the 
literature on dispossession pays inadequate attention to how the 
dispossessed, on the one hand, and the means of (re)production they are 
alienated from, on the other, are mobilised within a subsequent regime of 
accumulation. Our point here is not only that the encounter of money and 
worker is contingent (Read 2002: 29), echoing the critical perspectives we 
summarised above, but that both the production of labour and capital as 
such, and their incorporation into circuits of accumulation, need to be 
organised and managed within spatial arrangements. This organisation and 
management can take a variety of forms under different political economic 
and regulatory regimes, including neoliberalism.  
These two dimensions, on which the literature on accumulation is largely 
silent, are critical in explicating Turkey’s contemporary developmental 
regime under authoritarian neoliberalism. Many scholars of Turkey’s 
contemporary development have observed the qualitative differences that 
                                                 
2 A notable exception is Levien (2015), who argues that the state needs to assume an active 
role to ensure that dispossession is not contested, often through using a combination of 
coercion, legitimacy (ie. the perception that dispossession is instrumental for investments in 
public interest) and material concessions. While we agree with Levien’s point, a more 
comprehensive and analytical treatment of the roles assumed by the state is required.  
TURKEY’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OF ACCUMULATION     287 
 
mark this era – be it in the way that capital-state relations are forged, the 
shifts in the structural composition of the economy, or the predominance 
of financialisation. But it is the ascent of extractive sectors, such as 
construction, energy and mining, that has been the hallmark of the AKP’s 
regime of developmentalism. These revamped venues of accumulation are 
marked with the explicit and visible role that the state assumed in their 
restructuring, as a series of critical changes in the legal infrastructure – 
ranging from market liberalisation measures to centralisation of policy 
making –enabled their boom. The restructuring and liberalisation of 
energy markets were consolidated under AKP rule to open fields of energy 
investments previously beyond reach to the private sector, most notably 
coal and hydropower, buttressed by consistent relaxation of environmental 
legislation that could halt the development of the sector (Erensü 2017).  In 
the case of construction, state expropriations of land for purposes of 
redevelopment and unlatching of public lands into construction 
investments were eased, triggering a new wave of land commodification 
and marketisation. Concomitant to the appropriation of space and 
resources inherent to the ascent of extractive sectors has been the 
proliferation of urban and environmental resistances, unprecedented in 
scope and public visibility. From the Gezi Uprising of 2013 (Arsel et al. 
2019) to neighborhood resistances against gentrification, mobilisations 
against mega projects and rural revolts against mushrooming energy 
plants, the defense of rural and urban commons has been a common thread 
that social opposition has built on in this era .     
Undergirding this ‘neoliberal’ turn was an authoritarian one that built on 
centralisation, top-down decision-making and use of coercion. Existing 
legislation was modified, eliminated and/or sidetracked through a heavy 
reliance on executive measures, such as governmental decrees and eminent 
domain – both within the context of urban governance (Tansel 2019) and 
that of rural land and environmental protection. Governmental decrees 
have been systematically utilised to amend land-zoning provisions and 
designated protection statuses to allow energy, construction and mining 
investments (Adaman and Akbulut forthcoming), or to provide legal 
exemptions for particular projects. Eminent domain, on the other hand, has 
become almost a commonplace practice under the AKP regime, with a 
total of 2,186 cases until the end of 2018, with an overwhelming majority 
of land expropriations carried out for construction, infrastructure or energy 
projects. As has been observed (Tansel 2019; Adaman and Akbulut 
forthcoming), such streamlining of social and economic decision-making 
288     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY No 86 
 
– often justified on grounds of executive efficiency – does not merely 
imply a centralisation of state powers but, more fundamentally, serves to 
block and/or preempt mechanisms of contestation and opposition. Perhaps 
the most egregious example of this is the AKP’s systematic practice of 
shielding especially large-scale infrastructural projects from the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes. Despite the fact that 
EIA is operationalised more as a bureaucratic formality than a genuine and 
democratic process, it had become a primary vehicle through which both 
civil society actors and local communities could mobilise opposition and 
public awareness.  
That the ascent of construction, energy and mining coincided with the 
authoritarian turn under the AKP is no accident. These sectors rely 
fundamentally on the state’s ability to claim and redirect land and 
resources effectively, while simultaneously insulating itself from 
contestation (Adaman et al. 2017), through direct expropriations (either 
ordinary or under eminent domain), revision of zoning designations and 
commercialisation of public lands (Atasoy 2017). The processes of 
dispossession under the AKP included not only a transfer of private 
property rights from small/subsistence producers to capital, but also the 
eradication of rights to common and public resources under dynamics of 
executive centralisation and top-down decision-making. In this sense, 
authoritarianism has been inherent to, and a prerequisite of, the 
contemporary regime of developmentalism in Turkey. It also served to 
block and suppress opposition – both by blocking existing venues of social 
contestation, and the heightened use of force against urban and 
environmental resistances and their continued criminalization under the 
rhetoric that they were orchestrated by forces acting against the country’s 
progress and development (Adaman and Akbulut forthcoming).   
Perhaps more importantly, the developmentalist appeal of these sectors 
was integral to reproducing the hegemonic project of the Turkish state. 
Within a context where the state has historically acquired consent to its 
claim to rule through the promise of modernisation via economic growth 
– constructed as the collective interest of the people – the symbolic and 
material significance of these sectors have garnered support and 
legitimacy. Construction, energy and mining projects initiated in this 
period have unexceptionally been framed as key contributors to economic 
growth, defended in terms of employment creation, and cast as endeavors 
that will benefit all. The authoritarian clamping-down was, thus, 
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effectively fastened to the developmental promise through which social 
support was achieved and grievances were pre-empted.  
This accumulation regime, coupled with the rolling-out of the World Bank-
backed liberalisation of agriculture through the Agricultural Reform 
Implementation Project (ARIP), led to new forms of dispossession and 
proletarianisation, massive rural-urban migration, and radical changes in 
the patterns of land use (Keyder and Yenal 2011). While this process 
suggests a familiar picture of accumulation by dispossession, we argue that 
it actually depicts a more complicated dynamic. We claim that a specific 
form of accumulation has gained prominence in contemporary Turkey, 
distinct in the interlinked flows of resources, capital and labour that it 
mobilises, which would only inadequately be described as accumulation 
by dispossession.  
Instead, we propose the concept of accumulation by dislocation, to 
highlight that Turkey’s contemporary developmental strategy relies 
heavily not only on the expropriation of resources (and space), but also on 
their dislocation and transformation. We use the term dislocation with the 
aim of capturing the spatial dynamics through which resources and labour 
are organised into circuits of capital and mobilised towards industrial 
urban centers.  In doing so, we draw particular attention to (i) the shifts in 
prevalent forms of labour, (ii) the changes in the use of land and space, 
(iii) spatial arrangements that accompany the process and aftermath of 
dispossession, and (iv) the changing nature of the state’s participation in 
accumulation processes. We argue that this regime of accumulation is a 
particular form of developmentalism, shaped under authoritarian 
neoliberalism.  
While we claim that this dynamic is more broadly discernable as a regime 
of accumulation in contemporary Turkey, we will focus on the case of 
Artvin, a provincial region located at the Northeast corner of the country, 
to demonstrate our argument. Our analysis makes use of fieldwork 
conducted in the region intermittently between 2012-18, as well as in 
Western industrial centers Bursa and Kocaeli, which have been primary 
destinations of migration flows out of the region.3 While the initial impetus 
                                                 
3 The first round of the field study was conducted in October 2012, followed by three more 
rounds in August-September 2013, May 2014 and January 2018, respectively. The field 
study comprised in-depth interviews held with locals residing in the region, as well as those 
who had migrated to Bursa and Kocaeli. A total of 42 interviews were held. We would like 
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for our focus in the region was provided by the widespread local 
resistances against hydropower plants (Akbulut et al. 2018), the qualitative 
data we employ here builds on an expanded analytical and empirical scope 
that includes in-depth interviews and participant observation. Interviews 
were conducted between 2012 and 2018 with local residents, 
administrators and environmental activists, in addition to locals who 
migrated to Western industrial centers.  
Dislocating nature, shifting people: The case of Artvin 
I cannot help but wonder if the actual issue is to de-populate the region 
as a whole. In order to use the water more freely, to extract the mines 
more easily (Yıldırım, Mayor of Ardanuç 2012). 
We were doing fieldwork in the region in 2012 on local resistance 
movements against small-scale hydropower plants when we were struck 
by the words of the mayor of Ardanuç, an eastern township of Artvin 
provincial region, quoted above. The mayor was referring, first and 
foremost, to the micro-hydro power plants (HPPs) that had mushroomed 
in the region after the energy market liberalisation of the mid-2000s 
(Adaman et al. 2016). But he was also appealing to a broader dynamic by 
which the heightened flow of extractive investments into the region was 
dismantling the conditions that sustained rural communities and pushing 
them out in seeking livelihoods in urban centers; that ‘they are taking 
everything away from the people but doing nothing to maintain them in 
the region’. Similar remarks were repeated by an environmental 
lawyer/activist from the region two months later, during a workshop we 
held in Istanbul, where he framed the interlinked processes of 
environmental destruction and hydropower development as a more 
comprehensive – and intentional – project of ‘depopulationisation’ in 
order to convert Artvin into a region that ‘spits out’ raw materials, rather 
than a space where communities live. 
Artvin has been the target of intensive hydropower development and 
mining investments for much of the Republican history, but more 
pronouncedly within the last decade. In addition to the three big dams 
associated with the gigantic Çoruh River Basin Development Plan and 
                                                 
to thank Umut Kocagöz and Tilbe Akan for providing valuable research support during the 
field study.   
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enormous Yusufeli Dam expected to be completed by the end of 2020, the 
liberalisation of Turkey’s energy market made the region a hotspot for 
small-scale hydropower investments. These small-scale, diversion type 
run-of-river hydropower plants –which re-route streams to a suitable 
height by covered channels, from where they are dropped on turbines – 
mushroomed after the mid-2000s. There are around 100 planned HPPs 
within Artvin provincial area, of which 28 are operational and seven are 
under construction, in addition to more than 14 that are in various stages 
of licensing.4 While the construction and operation of HPPs do not require 
large tracts of land, their impact on the local availability of water has been 
critical, not least due to the appropriation of streams at their source and 
building of several consecutive plants on a given stream. Reduced water 
availability, in turn, did not only hurt market-oriented irrigated farming, 
but also subsistence production and livestock grazing due to its reportedly 
adverse impacts on pastures.  
The region’s hydraulic potential is matched by its mineral wealth, in 
particular gold and copper. Numerous mining projects – mostly at 
exploratory stages – are ongoing, some of which have gained high public 
visibility, such as the contested Cerrattepe gold mine. According to the 
General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA in its 
Turkish acronym), there are 11 active mines and 22 confirmed deposits 
within the provincial region.5 While exact figures on land use by mining 
are notoriously difficult to obtain, 39.5 percent of all land within the 
provincial region had been licensed to mining companies as of 2016, 
adding-up to almost 300,000 hectares under 153 licenses.6 It is safe to 
assume that this figure has only increased since then. For instance, in 2019, 
news broke of two large mining concessions – approximating 3,500 and 
4,000 hectares, respectively – being given to companies known to be close 
to the government.7 Finally, this rush to hydropower and mining has taken 
place against the backdrop of massive out-migration, as 5-7 percent of the 
province’s population migrated every year from 2008 to 2018.8  
                                                 
4 https://www.enerjiatlasi.com/sehir/artvin/. 
5 https://www.mta.gov.tr/v3.0/sayfalar/hizmetler/maden-haritalari/artvin.pdf. 
6 https://www.birgun.net/haber/dogu-karadeniz-deki-6-kentin-yuzde-38-7-si-madenlere      
ayrilmis-108546. 
7 https://www.artvinden.com/artvin-hod-maden-projesinde-halkin-katilim-toplantisi-          
yapilacak/, and https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2019/08/30/cengiz-ve-kalyoncu-
artvinde-yeni-maden-sahasi-acacak/. 
8 Data compiled by authors from address-based population registry system.  
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That the influx of energy and mining capital often implies large scale 
dispossession of rural producers is now well discussed. Yet, we claim that 
the dynamics we observe point to something more than dispossession that 
cannot be adequately captured by it. We argue, in particular, that they 
comprise an accumulation regime that dislocates and mobilises labour, raw 
materials and energy from the region to centers of industry predominantly, 
but not exclusively, in Western Turkey. We call this regime accumulation 
by dislocation, rather than dispossession, for two interrelated reasons. 
Firstly, the term points to the spatial mechanisms through which resources 
and labour are organised into circuits of capital. It also complicates the 
notion of dispossession by shedding light on forms of alienation that fall 
outside of direct dispossession of producers from means of (re)production, 
as we demonstrate below. Secondly, the term highlights the aftermath of 
the moment of expropriation – ie. what happens to the expropriated means 
of production and dispossessed, through which mechanisms and towards 
which ends they are mobilised and managed.  
Below, we focus on three dimensions to further explicate how this regime 
of accumulation unravels: (i) the shifts in the forms of labour in which the 
dispossessed producers engage, (ii) the changes in the spatial arrangements 
that accompany the process and aftermath of dispossession, and (iii) how 
the flows of different elements of accumulation (energy, labour and 
resources) are choreographed by the Turkish state through construction of 
markets and incentive mechanisms.  
Forms of labour 
Our interviews, both in Artvin and industrial centers like Bursa and Izmit, 
illustrate that extractive investments in the region have triggered a switch 
from subsistence-oriented activities to wage labour. Mirroring the general 
pattern in the region, the majority of our interviewees used to significantly 
rely on farming and livestock production, often with limited market-
orientation, yet complemented them with some form of paid employment. 
With the influx of hydropower and energy investments, many were forced 
to switch to wage-labour as their sole source of livelihood, as they had 
been separated from their means of (re)production, such as land and water.  
This separation took more variegated forms than the literature on 
accumulation by dispossession suggests. While the most evident 
mechanism within this context is land expropriations tied to extractive 
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investments, a less visible – but possibly more prevalent – dynamic is the 
dismantling of the conditions of production and subsistence by their 
indirect impacts. The reduced availability of water with the construction 
of HPPs had adverse impacts on small-scale agriculture and livestock 
production, leading many to give up livelihood activities. Furthermore, the 
noise and pollution associated with construction, together with micro-
climatic changes, disrupted beekeeping, a prevalent source of livelihood, 
where many interviewees reported lost hives. These cases illustrate a form 
of separation through a dislocation from the spatial conditions of 
production and subsistence, rather than a direct dispossession from the 
means of production. Extractive investments dislocated and ultimately 
dispossessed the rural communities through undermining the (spatial) 
conditions of their (re)production and many have sold their land and other 
assets as they switched into wage labour. One of our interviewees’ remarks 
about the expected impacts of a planned HPP project in her village in 2012, 
summarise what already had occurred, and was expected to happen, more 
broadly in the region:  
Water is everything here […] If they build [the HPP], there won’t be 
any produce in the garden, there won’t be any water in the pastures. If 
the pastures dry out, there won’t be any hay to give to the livestock; if 
the grass dries out, that will put an end to livestock. If livestock ends, 
I’m asking you, how are we going to make money? If the water ends, 
we all end. 
While some found employment locally in hydropower and mining 
projects, often as temporary staff or in subcontracting firms during 
construction phases, most moved to urban centers in the West or within the 
region seeking paid work. Significant outmigration occurred, first 
triggered by land expropriations associated with large dams (most notably 
the Yusufeli dam, displacing around 20,000 people) and perpetuated by the 
more recent wave of HPPs. Our interviewees framed migration as the 
adopted coping mechanism when bases of livelihoods were eradicated and 
wage labour became the only viable option. Yet migration does not 
guarantee or automatically imply incorporation into wage labour. Some of 
our interviewees had found paid employment and a few had established 
small businesses, but these seem to have been short-lived and precarious. 
In addition, migration to urban centers was not an opportunity equally 
available to all: both the mobility it presupposes and possibility to find 
employment in its aftermath, require access to networks and resources. As 
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succinctly put by one of our interviewees, ‘if you don’t have the chance to 
go anywhere else, you stay and fight [against the HPP]’.  
In pointing to the changes in forms of labour, we do not imply a kind of 
functionalism that Li (2014) criticises as a teleological trap. In other 
words, we do not claim that dispossession had been undertaken explicitly 
and intentionally to create wage labour for fractions of capital that has 
benefited from the immediate processes of dispossession. While some of 
the dispossessed have, indeed, been incorporated into local circuits of 
capital as wage labourers, this has been more a strategy to preempt local 
resistances employed by energy and mining companies. Our argument is 
not about an inherent and intentional direction of this process: the 
separation of rural producers from their means of (re)production forced 
them out of their traditional networks and bases of livelihoods and 
subsistence, making them more dependent on wage labour. In this sense, 
following the original formulation by Marx, as well as later work on the 
continuous character of enclosures (eg. De Angelis 2004), we see the 
defining point of changing forms of labour arsing from dispossession as 
less the moment of being incorporated into wage labour, than having to 
rely (to an increased extent) on the sale of labour power to secure one’s 
livelihood. 
What the concept of dislocation opens-up for us is the spatial organisation 
of the separation from means of (re)production and its aftermath. This 
organisation reveals a specific dynamic by which the dispossessed are not 
directly or automatically absorbed into circuits of capital within the region 
(echoing Read [2002], Hall [2013] and Li [2014]). Rather, they are 
dislocated and mobilised to urban centers as potential or actual wage 
labourers, in precarious or secure conditions. While it is difficult to 
pinpoint the exact targets of this movement, our interviews and migration 
statistics suggest that industrial centers in the West – such as Bursa, 
Istanbul and Kocaeli – have been the primary destinations precisely due to 
the potential of finding paid employment in industry.  
Rearrangement of space 
The revamped literature on accumulation by dispossession has paid only 
scant attention to the spatial processes through which resources are 
converted into capital and, subsequently, incorporated into circuits of 
accumulation. This lack of attention, as we discussed earlier, risks 
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overlooking the physical-spatial transformations wrought by the dynamics 
of dispossession.   
The case of Artvin is a vivid demonstration that dispossession implies a 
change in the form and objective of the use of the means of reproduction, 
with obvious socio-spatial implications. Land use in the region has 
changed dramatically as lands previously devoted to subsistence and/or 
small-scale market-oriented farming are now devoted to raw material 
extraction and energy production. That around 40 percent of the province’s 
area is licensed to mining companies is illustrative in this respect. Another 
striking example is the land expropriations associated with the massive 
Çoruh Basin Development Plan. The Yusufeli Dam alone required 864 
hectares to be expropriated, whereas lands expropriated for the three 
completed dams totaled up to approximately 1,000 hectares, more than 80 
percent of which had been used for agricultural purposes (Bahçalı et al. 
2017).  
This staggering shift in land use happened within an approach that 
crystallised during the AKP era, best encapsulated in the words of Taner 
Yıldız, who served as the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources 
between 2009-15: ‘we prefer [what is] beneath the land if it is richer than 
[what is] above it’.9 Recited numerous times by our interviewees, the 
Minister’s statement points to the predominance that economic rationality 
gained in approaching land, where it is framed as a resource that should be 
allocated to its most economically valuable use, based on a calculation of 
costs and benefits, ie. economisation (Madra and Adaman 2014). This 
allocation has been organised and realised indirectly by the Turkish state, 
where it set up markets and incentive mechanisms that would bring about 
a redirection of land to energy and mining investments and away from the 
subsistence use. 
A second, and interwoven, dynamic that the case of Artvin suggests is the 
dislocation of energy and extracted resources away from the region. Much 
like labour, energy and resources produced in the region have not been 
incorporated into immediate circuits of capital, but rather mobilised 
towards industrial centers, often in the West. While detailed data to 
demonstrate this movement is very difficult to acquire, we provide a few 
                                                 
9 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=115186, authors’ 
translation. 
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illustrations.10 The ratio of energy-produced to energy-consumed for the 
provincial region is 935 percent, which points to a huge energy surplus 
directed outside.11 In this respect, Artvin is in stark contrast to Western 
industrial centers – such as Bursa (61 percent), Kocaeli (23 percent) and 
Istanbul (14 percent) – which emerge as energy importers. Such an outflow 
seems to be the case also in mining: although data on the flow of mined 
materials or the profits of mining firms are not available, the few big 
investors happen to be capital groups known to be close to the government 
and headquartered in Istanbul.  
Our argument is not about the direction of this flow per se, but rather that 
a specific spatial organisation has been inherent to this accumulation 
regime. The case of Artvin demonstrates that the incorporation of 
resources into circuits of accumulation cannot be presumed; rather, it 
needs to be organised and managed, often with spatial arrangements. We 
claim that this process took a specific form, in which energy and extracted 
resources (together with labour) have been mobilised away from the region 
and towards urban industrial centers. It is this form and organisation that 
we capture by the term ‘accumulation by dislocation’.   
Role of the state 
The case of Artvin illustrates the layered and multiple roles that the Turkish 
state plays in building, participating in and mediating the processes of 
accumulation by dispossession. The state does not only expropriate 
resources acting on behalf of capital, but also – and more importantly –
introduces dynamics that alienate rural communities from the spatial 
conditions of their (re)production. As we discussed earlier, a more 
pervasive dynamic of dispossession within the context of Artvin was 
brought by the restructuring of energy and mining sectors that have 
culminated in processes alienating small producers from the territorial 
basis of their livelihoods – not through their direct expulsion from land, 
but rather by undermining the spatial conditions of their (re)productive 
activities. In this sense, the Turkish state emerges as an actor that sets the 
stage for dispossession, as much as one that directly carries it out, through 
                                                 
10 Neither the names of mining and energy companies operating and/or licensed to operate 
within the region, nor their sales data, are public. Access to information requests on the 
issue have also been systematically denied by the AKP government.  
11 https://www.enerjiatlasi.com/sehir/. 
TURKEY’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OF ACCUMULATION     297 
 
constructing markets and appropriate incentive mechanisms. Relatedly, 
the state’s role in extending commodification is not limited to directly 
embedding rural resources – such as land and water – within market 
dynamics, but also includes the choreographing of markets and capital in 
specific ways that enable (further) commodification.  
The Turkish state’s role in the aftermath of dispossession is similarly an 
orchestrating one. As the case of Artvin illustrates, the automatic or 
immediate absorption of labour and resources into circuits of accumulation 
cannot be assumed a priori. They have neither been incorporated into the 
same circuits of capital accumulation, nor have they been absorbed by the 
fractions of capital that have benefitted from dispossession. The 
dispossessed and resources from which they are alienated have been 
mobilised into circuits of accumulation through the state’s constellation 
and mediation of markets, viz. those for labour power, land, energy and 
extracted minerals, and its establishment of conditions conducive for their 
institutionalisation.  
Furthermore, a particular spatial dynamic has been built into this process, 
as labour and resources have been dislocated away from their immediate 
surroundings and mobilised towards industrial urban centers. As we have 
illustrated above, migration to urban centers, primarily industrial cities in 
the West, has been concomitant to the alienation of rural communities from 
their means of (re)production, and the resultant switch from subsistence 
production into wage labour. Our interviews and desktop research suggest 
that energy produced and minerals extracted in the region are similarly 
shifted elsewhere, predominantly the West. This spatial dynamic has been 
driven by broader processes produced and mediated by the Turkish state, 
including the comprehensive wave of agricultural liberalisation with the 
roll-out of ARIP; ongoing eradication of rural infrastructure and extensive 
commodification of rural commons; and labour market policies that 
incentivise various forms of precarious employment. In turn, it has 
‘energised’ and enabled the commodification of land and housing, which 
gained an unprecedented ‘effectiveness’ with the executive centralisation 
in urban settings (Tansel 2019), as it transported the energy and labour 
power that underlie the construction boom in urban centers.  
What makes the case of Turkey distinct is that this orchestrating role of the 
state intimates a particular form of developmentalism shaped under 
authoritarian neoliberalism. The Turkish state has not given up on its claim 
on developmentalism, as modernisation and progress through rapid 
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economic development continues to be the strongest ideal that marks state-
society relationships (Arsel 2005; Adaman et al. 2017). As such, it forms 
the most important basis through which the state can represent itself as a 
neutral actor embodying the collective interest of society and eliciting 
consent to its claim to rule (Akbulut et al. 2018; Akbulut 2019; Adaman 
and Akbulut forthcoming). This points to the fact that states, while 
participating and mediating accumulation processes, can become actors 
beyond passive instruments of capital – instead, holding motivations that 
pertain to the reproduction of their own existence and legitimacy.  
Yet, the realisation of this project in contemporary Turkey is discernibly 
different than that found in traditional developmentalism. On the one hand, 
rather than a Rostowian logic of explicit state action directing resources to 
particular ends, the Turkish state emerges as a choreographer that 
establishes markets, incentives and participant actors, and indirectly 
mobilises labour, resources and capital from the countryside to industrial 
centers. Inherent to this choreography is the rendering of rural space as a 
resource and people as human capital to be allocated where it will be most 
efficiently used – ie. the economisation of economic, political, social and 
ecological spheres. On the other hand, increased centralisation, heavier 
reliance on the executive, and immobilising social contestation under 
authoritarianism have, together, allowed the Turkish state to move much 
more effectively and rapidly in constructing and mediating markets. It is 
in this sense that accumulation by dislocation emerges as a regime of 
developmentalism under authoritarian neoliberalism.  
Conclusion 
In the summer of 2015, a new wave of environmental resistance was 
sparked by the AKP’s proposed Green Road project that would span the 
Northern coast of the country. A 2,600 km-long highway to connect the 
plateaus of eight provinces with tourism centers planned in 40 different 
locations along the route, the Green Road was defended, unsurprisingly, 
as a regional development project by the government. Yet, it was fiercely 
opposed by activists and locals, who said it would destroy traditional 
grazing routes and disrupt beekeeping. In addition to taking direct action 
(occupying the planned itinerary in tents) and initiating legal struggle, the 
activists started floating the idea that the younger generations still living 
in the region should take-up animal grazing as their livelihood en masse. 
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For them, it represented a way of reclaiming the land and reproducing the 
material basis of their link to rural space. It was framed as reversing the 
dislocation of rural communities that had paved the way for such a 
destructive project in the first place; it was a strategy to relocate and enable 
resistance through relocation.12 
This anecdote speaks to how resistance and struggle have been shaped in 
response to processes of dislocation engendered by Turkey’s 
contemporary developmental regime under authoritarian neoliberalism. 
We have used the term ‘accumulation by dislocation’, rather than 
dispossession, to explicate this regime for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, 
the term points to the spatial mechanisms through which resources and 
labour are made elements of accumulation. It complicates the notion of 
dispossession by shedding light on forms of alienation that fall outside of 
direct dispossession of producers from means of (re)production. We have 
argued that, within this context, an emerging dynamic has arisen from 
processes dismantling rural communities’ conditions of 
subsistence/existence and dislocating them from their means of 
(re)production without directly expropriating them. This dynamic entails 
not only the liberalisation of agriculture and consequent loss of income 
from farming (‘the push factor’, according to Adaman et al. [2019]); more 
importantly, it also involves spatial-environmental impacts triggered by 
extractive projects which destroy the basis of livelihoods and dislocating 
producers by pushing them to pursue wage labour.  
Secondly, the term directs our attention to the aftermath of the moment of 
expropriation, i.e. what happens to the expropriated means of production 
and dispossessed, the mechanisms through which they are managed, and 
the ends to which they are mobilised. We have argued that their 
incorporation into circuits of accumulation took a specific spatial form in 
Turkey, in which they have been dislocated from their immediate 
surroundings and mobilised towards urban centers. This form has been 
organised and managed by the Turkish state under neoliberal 
authoritarianism: it depended, on the one hand, on a constellation of 
markets, incentives and participant actors that mediated the flows of 
labour, materials and energy. On the other hand, this particular 
constellation was enabled by increased centralisation, heavier reliance on 
                                                 
12 Personal communication with the first author. 
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the executive, and the blocking-off of social contestation under 
authoritarianism.  
The notion of ‘accumulation by dislocation’ also serves as an entry-point 
to illustrate the active role that states can play within this context. We have 
demonstrated that the Turkish state cannot be seen as a passive instrument 
at the service of capital. Rather, it is a mobiliser of a specific 
developmental paradigm, in which flows of capital, materials, energy and 
labour are marshalled to specific ends via the construction and 
organisation of markets. Relatedly, we have argued that this process 
reproduced the Turkish state’s hegemony more broadly by eliciting 
consent to its claim to rule. This points to the need for a more nuanced 
treatment of the role and logic of state involvement in processes of 
accumulation by dispossession.  
While our argument builds on the specific case of Artvin and the 
contemporary form of developmentalism in Turkey, the regime of 
accumulation by dislocation is neither historically novel, nor unique to 
contemporary Turkey. As the notion complicates the framework of 
accumulation by dispossession, it can, indeed, be applied more broadly to 
explicate dynamics so far inadequately captured within this framework, 
eg. various forms of managing the production of labour and capital as such, 
along with their incorporation into circuits of accumulation. Perhaps more 
importantly, the notion sheds light on aspects that have arguably gained 
more global pertinence with the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism and 
continued appeal of developmentalism – namely, the changing logic and 
form of state involvement in accumulation processes.  
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